The world is in the midst of a wave of privatization of state-owned enterprises. We examine how privatization affects workers and how firm-level employment relates to worker-level estimates. Using administrative data from Sweden, we show that following a privatization workers' unemployment incidence increases by a fifth and their number of unemployment days by a quarter. Labor earnings and labor force participation remain unchanged. Despite increased transitions to unemployment, employment at the firm-level remains unchanged suggesting that firm-level estimates don't proxy well for worker-level outcomes. These results shed light on the welfare costs of privatization and how they can be mitigated.
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and Svejnar, 2009; Earle, 2014) . Most studies focus on firm-level employment. Key contributions include La Porta and de Silanes (1999) , Lizal and Svejnar (2002) , Jones and Simon (2005) , and Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2006) . Worker-level studies are rare. There are some pioneering small-sample studies, such as Haskel and Szymanski (1993) , Kikeri (1998) , and Peoples and Talley (2001) , and the more recent papers of Brown, Earle, and Vakhitov (2006) , Oreland (2010) , Melly and Puhani (2013) , Bastos, Monteiro, and Straume (2014) . Moreover, Arnold (2018) provides a contemporaneous and complementary study of the effects of privatization on workers in Brazil.
Our contribution to this literature is threefold. 2 First, the data we analyze is superior in its coverage (population), duration (two decades), and detail (firm links and demographic information). We directly observe three key labor market outcomes (unemployment, labor income, and whether a person is leaving the labor force), attrition from our sample is not an issue, and population data means that we compare workers who are part of privatization to their comparable (in observable dimension) peers who are not. The data gives us more precision and mitigates selection concerns that often arise when relying on survey data.
Detailed demographics allow us to perform analyses on who wins and who loses from privatization. Finally, the panel dimension permits us to study the effects of privatization on workers in the long run over eight years following each event, analyzing pre-years help us evaluate pre-trends in labor market outcomes, and the longtime series makes it possible to separate between worker effects of privatization in good versus bad economic conditions. Hence, we can show that the costs of privatization for workers and society can be substantial and that efforts to mitigate the costs of privatization for workers should focus on less skilled workers, workers with weaker employment protections, and helping workers that are part of privatization during bad economic conditions. Second, we provide evidence that firm-level employment effects may not be informative on worker-level effects as it misses out on potential adverse effects on workers from churn. A null effect on overall employment can hide substantial costs to existing workers if new hires replace them and they enter unemployment. Thus, evaluations of the costs of privatization for workers should ideally be performed using matched employer-employee data.
Third, we provide evidence from a developed country with a stable institutional environment. This evidence complements existing studies on the worker level effects from privatization in developing countries. As Megginson (2017) show, the top ten nations in privatization revenues in 2015 were China, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, India, Sweden, Australia, the United States, Netherlands, and Ireland. Several of these countries have institutional environments and labor markets that resemble those of Sweden. For example, Lazear and Shaw (2009) report strong similarities between labor markets in Scandinavian countries and Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the empirical strategy and data. Section 3 studies the overall labor market effects of privatization while Section 4 provides evidence on who gains and who loses from privatization. Section 5 presents a firm level analysis and Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical strategy and data
Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy is to use a difference-in-differences estimator that compares the outcomes of a treated and a control group of workers before and after privatization events. We 4 model outcome Y of worker i at year t as:
where λ t is yearly time effects and Treat i is an indicator variable for workers who are employed in an SOE that is privatized one time period later (treated), and, zero for workers in the control group that in the same time period are employed in a SOE not privatized one year later. Finally, DiD it takes the value one for treated workers in the time period of the privatization and all periods after, zero otherwise. A worker's treatment status is kept constant over time, irrespectively of the labor market status before and after the time period of treatment assignment, which means that the coefficient β captures an average intentionto-treat effect.
To capture short, medium and long run effects separately, we augment the model in the following way:
where τ p is time period effects (years 1-2, years 3-4 and years 5-8 leaving the years -3-0 as the baseline period) so that β p captures an average intention-to-treat effect during period p.
Data
Our data comes from Sweden. Like many other nations, Sweden experienced an expansion of the public sector after the second world war. In the mid-1980s the public sector accounted for around 37% of employment in Sweden and roughly 63% of GDP according to Statistics Sweden. With such a large public sector, politicians and the public opinion started to be worried about the efficiency and cost of the public sector. As a consequence, many privatization of SOEs took place during the 1990s and employment in the public sector decreased from around 38% in 1987 to roughly 29% in 2017, see Figure 2 . Yet, despite such a drop in public employment, Sweden still lies above the OECD average of 21% as of today.
For the Swedish data, we turn to Statistics Sweden's database LISA. LISA includes persons older than 15 years of age that are registered in Sweden. LISA matches workers to firms as of November every year and includes data from several government registers with the consequence that a person exits the database only by dying or moving to another country. From LISA, we extract annual information on age, gender, education, residence municipality, firm affiliation (if any), annual labor income, and the yearly number of days registered as unemployed. We also extract information on the employers' industry and ownership status.
Using firms' ownership status, we define transitions from SOE to non-SOE between two consecutive years as a privatization event. 3 We restrict the sample to privatizations of limited liability SOEs ("aktiebolag") between 1996 and 2010, since unemployment data is available to us in LISA for 1992 to 2011. This gives us at least four pre-periods for evaluation of parallel trends before treatment.
The labor market outcomes, Y it , that we analyze are unemployment incidence (whether a person has registered unemployment days or not in a year), annual number of unemployment days, annual labor income, and leaving the labor force (no annual labor income nor any registered unemployment days). In all regressions, we cluster the standard errors at the local labor market level (residence municipality).
The above models provide causal estimates of the treatment effect (β ) under the common trends assumption and the stable unit value treatment assumption (SUTVA). The parallel trend assumption requires that the treated and control groups have parallel trends in the absence of privatization. Because the counterfactual outcomes are unobservable, it is impossible to test this assumption. But we assess the plausibility of the assumption by comparing trends before treatment. Historical parallel trends suggest that shocks in the past have similarly affected the two groups. The SUTVA assumption is likely to hold in our setting since we select controls out of the entire population of SOE employees. It is unlikely that a privatization event in one part of Sweden affects control workers in another part of Sweden. Moreover, a worker's treatment status is kept constant over time in Equation 1 and 2 which rules out a compositional bias since workers only leave our sample if they die or migrate from Sweden. We create the control group by randomly choosing one control worker for each treated worker within year and industry. The procedure is as follows. For each combination of year and industry where there has been at least one privatization, we randomly assign one non-treated worker employed in limited liability SOEs with more than ten employees to each treated worker. 4 Since we cluster the standard errors at a higher aggregation level than the individual level, our estimates are not affected by a worker appearing repeatedly as a control worker. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for treated and control workers. The ordinary tvalue is a function of the sample size and decreases by the size of the sample, so it is better to rely on the normalized t-value when sample sizes are large (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) .
Summary statistics and the control group
A normalized t-value above 0.25 indicates a substantial difference in means. Despite our rather simple matching procedure to find control workers, the normalized t-value shows that the treated and control groups resemble each other well on average. This is an indication that firms are not selectively privatized on the basis of worker characteristics.
The labor market effects of privatizations
We start our examination of the labor market effects of privatizations by inspecting pretrends for the treated and control group of workers in all four main outcome variables: unemployment incidence, unemployment days, labor income, and being outside of the labor force. Prior to privatization, which occurs at some point between event time zero and one, Figure 3 shows that the treated and control groups behave similar to each other in all four outcomes. Unemployment incidence, unemployment days, and out of labor force incidence continuously decline from minus three to zero while labor income increases. These patterns are a direct consequence of that we match workers at event time zero so the workers are required to have a job at this point. 5 The nearly identical pre-trends in all outcome variables combined with the similarity in means of several observable individual characteristics prior to treatment in Table 2 lends support to our identification strategy.
Figure 3 also indicates that privatizations are associated with moves to unemployment.
5 While we could match workers at time minus three to remove these downward trends, this would give workers a four year time span to leave the firm prior to the firm becoming privately owned. The intention-totreat effect we estimate would thus likely differ from the average treatment effect on the treated since so many workers would have left the firm before it went private.
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In the post-period, unemployment incidence and unemployment days increases for treated workers relative the control workers starting from one year after the privatization event.
The effect is persists over the full eight-year post-period. There is, however, no apparent large differences between the treated and control workers in terms of labor income or being outside the labor force. Table 3 reports difference-in-differences coefficients from estimating the model in Equation 1 and 2 using OLS. Column 1 in Panel A shows that mean unemployment incidence for treated workers increases by 1.5 percentage points per year during the eight-year post period and that the effect is statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level. In comparison to the level among treated workers before the privatization, the estimated effect corresponds to a 17.8% increase per year. Unemployment days also increase among treated workers. Column 2 shows an increase by 2.2 unemployment days on average per year which converts to a 24.7% relative to the pre-privatization mean for treated workers. There is a lot of persistence in unemployment incidence and days. Columns 1 and 2 in Panel B shows that unemployment is higher both in the short run (year one to two), medium run (year three to four), and the long run (year five to eight). The long run point estimates are also more than double the size of the short run estimates and all estimates are statistically significant at the one percent level. The economic magnitudes are quite large. Our estimates suggest about 25% more unemployment days per year for an average worker, which converts to almost one million extra unemployment days generated in the Swedish economy for the 52,468 treated workers in our sample. 6 Columns 3 and 4 repeat the exercise for the log of annual labor income and incidence of being outside of the labor force. The top cells in Panel A confirm the pattern from Figure   3 that privatizations seem to not have changed average labor income or the incidence of leaving the labor force. If anything, there is a weak indication (statistically significant at the ten percent level) that the incidence of being outside of the labor force decreases by 0.04 percentage points. Panel B shows that there are no short or medium run effects on either outcome, but that the small decrease in the incidence of being outside of the labor force shows up in years five to eight (still statistically significant only at the ten percent level).
Why do we observe increases in unemployment, yet there are no apparent effects on annual labor income? One possible explanation is that workers that enter unemployment have lower annual labor income, but that their decrease is offset by increases in annual labor income for workers that remain employed. Another possibility is that the impact of increased unemployment is too weak to have a meaningful impact on annual labor income.
An annual income loss of 2.2 days of extra unemployment out of a total number of working days of around 250 per year suggests a decrease in annual labor income of less than one percent. 7 Which is not far from the statistically insignificant decrease of 1.1 percent in Column 3 of Panel A in Table 3 .
To sum up, privatizations in Sweden seem to have been associated with costs for workers on average in the sense that they have led to persistent increases in unemployment.
Next, we turn to investigating heterogeneous effects of privatizations on workers by analyzing who gains and who loses from privatizations.
Second, skilled workers may be better positioned than unskilled workers in finding a new job if they are laid off. Third, it could also be that hiring policies in SOEs put more weight on other characteristics than skills, such as political connections, which makes them prone to retaining less skilled workers in the firm relative to private firms.
For evidence, we first study heterogeneous effects across the talent distribution of workers. We obtain data on cognitive and non-cognitive skills of workers from the Swedish Military Archives. Information is available for men drafted . During this period, Sweden had mandatory military service and the draftees were tested by the military to assess suitability for different branches of the military. Lindqvist and Vestman (2011) describe in detail how these tests were performed. The goal of the cognitive test is to measure inductive reasoning, verbal comprehension, spatial ability, and technical understanding while the non-cognitive tests were interviews with psychologists who examine social maturity, intensity, mental energy, and emotional stability. Both test are measured on standard nine (STANINE) scale with a mean of five and standard deviation of two.
In Table 4 and Figure 4 , we report results when we split up the workers by talent. A worker is defined as low talent of the sum of his cognitive and non-cognitive skills is below the mean, high talent otherwise. Results in Panel A and B in Table 4 show an increased unemployment incidence for both low and high talent workers, after a privatization but the increase is much larger for low talented workers (2.2 percentage points vs 0.06 percentage points). The difference is statistically significant. Unemployment days increases for low talent workers, but not for high talent workers. Panels C and D show that labor income decreases for less talented workers and that there are no effects on leaving the labor force.
Second, we examine the effects across workers' education level. Table 5 report the results when we divide the sample into workers with high and low skill based on their education level (high skill if having more than two year of post secondary education, low skill otherwise). Figure 5 reports the corresponding figures for inspecting the pre-trends in the outcome variables. Although Panel A reveals no statistically significant differences between skilled and unskilled workers in terms of unemployment, Panel B shows that unskilled workers do tend to have greater short and medium run increases in unemployment incidence by about one percentage point. There is also evidence that skilled workers tend to do better over time relative to unskilled workers in terms of labor income. Panel C shows a 9.1 percent increase in wages for skilled workers which represents a 12.2 percent increase relative low skilled workers. The effect monotonically increases over time after the privatization event. There is also evidence that skilled workers are less likely to be outside of the labor force after privatization in Columns 4 to 6 in Panel C and D.
Finally, we consider heterogeneity across the age of workers as improvements in productivity following privatizations can come about due to technological upgrading, which might affect older workers with more outdated skills the most. In Table 6 and Figure 6 , we show estimates by age where a worker is defined as old if older than the median age (42 years) one year before the privatization, young otherwise. The cost of privatization seems to fall on older workers. Workers aged above 42 years have higher unemployment incidence, longer unemployment duration, and lower annual labor income compared to younger workers after privatization events. These differences are all statistically significantly different from each other.
In sum, we find evidence of stronger negative effects on less skilled workers compared to more skilled workers independently of our measure of skills. These results are consistent with Melly and Puhani (2013) and Brown, Earle, and Vakhitov (2006) , who both find that less skilled workers do worse after privatization compared to more skilled workers.
Employment protection legislation
Let us now consider to what extent employment protection shield workers from entering unemployment after privatization. The question is relevant because the employment pro-tection vary across countries and as such it is informative about the external validity of our results. Sweden had in 2004 the seventh-strongest employment protection among 30 OECD countries (OECD, 2004) , so if employment protection protect workers our estimates could be viewed as a lower bound on the worker costs of privatization.
We proxy employment protection status with firm-specific tenure: workers with high security are workers with more than two years of tenure. We do this because of the Swedish employment protection legislation LAS ("Lagen om anställningsskydd") states that temporary employment contracts become permanent after two years. Since workers on permanent contracts are much harder to fire, two years of tenure come with increased labor market protections. Additionally, LAS states that firms that have shortage of work, need to follow a tenured based dismissal order when downsizing their workforce. In practice, this means that the last worker hired, should be the first worker dismissed. Table 7 report the results when we divide the sample into workers with strong and weak employment protection. Figure 7 reports the corresponding figures for inspecting the pretrends in the outcome variables. Employment protection seems to play a role. Results in Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A and B show that workers with relative weak protection experience an increase in unemployment incidence of 2.6 percentage points whereas the corresponding effect for workers with relative strong protections is only 1.4 percentage points. Both estimates are statistically significant at the one percent level. In percentage terms, however, the increase is much larger for the workers with strong protections (77% vs 19%) since their pre-mean of unemployment incidence is only 2 percentage points compared to 14 percentage points for workers with weaker protection. Column 3 shows that there are statistically significant differences between workers with strong and weak protection. Estimates in Columns 4 to 6 in Panel A show that there are no apparent differences in unemployment days. Although workers with weak protection experience an increase in unemployment days of 3.4 days compared to 2.3 days for workers with strong protections, the 13 estimates are not statistically significantly different from each other. Panel B shows that the effect increases over time, both for unemployment incidence and for unemployment days.
We also find a relative decrease in labor income for workers with weaker protection of 7.7 percentage points, but no effects on wage for workers with strong protection, see In sum, consistent with the hypothesis that employment protection shield workers from the negative effects of privatizations we do find that workers with stronger protection (i.e. those with longer tenure in the firm) are less affected compared to workers with weaker protection (those with shorter tenure in the firm).
Economic conditions
One advantage of our data is that it covers multiple upturns and downturns in the economy. This allows us to investigate if the labor market effects of privatizations vary over the business cycle. Such variation could come about due to the cyclical nature of job vacancies or to cyclical variation in what types of firms are privatized. First, since privatizations are associated with increased unemployment incidence, the number of unemployment days might increase when jobs are difficult to find. Conversely, when jobs are easy to find privatizations might not lead to unemployment as workers that lose their jobs quickly find new ones. Second, the politicians that decide on privatizations might procrastinate to privatize companies in which they know workers would lose their jobs. Such companies might then only be privatized when times are bad and tough decisions must be made to raise money. simply because the worst run companies are privatized in bad times. Table 8 report the results when we divide the sample into privatizations that occur in upturns and those in downturns of the economy. Figure 8 reports the corresponding figures for inspecting the pre-trends in the outcome variables. We define years with a negative GDP-gap as downturn years (1997, 98, 98, 99, 2003, 05, 08, 09, 10) Column 6 shows that the differences between the upturn and downturn years are statistically significantly different from each other.
While we do not find evidence on privatizations affecting labor income on average during our whole sample period, Panels C and D Columns 1 to 2 show that privatizations are associated with decreases in annual labor income of 6.2% when they take place in 15 downturns. There is also some evidence of an increase in annual labor income of about the same magnitude in upturns. The estimate in Panel C is statistically significant at the ten percent level for the full post-period while the effect in the medium run is statistically significant at the five percent level. In upturns, less workers also seems to leave the labor force as the fraction outside of the labor force declines by 0.9 percentage points. For both annual labor income and being outside the labor force, Columns 3 and 6 indicate that the differences between upturn and downturn years are statistically significantly different from each other.
In sum, there is evidence of cyclicality in the labor market effects of privatizations with privatizations in economic downturns being worse for workers compared to privatizations in economic upturns.
Firm level analysis
The worker level analysis showed evidence consistent with the idea that privatizations trigger a reorganization of the workforce. Is there any evidence in our sample that this reorganization affects productivity and firm size?
When matching privatized SOEs with those that are not privatized we follow the same random matching procedure as we do for workers. That is, for each SOE that is privatized we randomly pick one SOE not privatized within the same industry and year. The matching is done one year before the privatization. In contrast to our worker-level analysis, our firm-level analysis could suffer from attrition bias. The reason is that ownership changes like privatizations are often associated with complex restructurings, such as internal organization, acquisitions, and divestitures, with the consequence that the firm identifier changes.
Hence, it is difficult to track firms over time, so we limit the pre and post period to three years in this analysis. Figure 9A displays the trends for the treated and control group firms over time in av-erage productivity (measured as value added per employee) and in average firm size (measured as the number of employees). The trends in productivity in the two groups show similar patterns before privatization. But after, the figure shows that the productivity for treated firms increases relative to control firms and that the effect rises over time. In contrast, Figure 9B shows that firm size seem to be unaffected by privatization with similar trends for treated and control firms during both the pre and post period. Table 9 Column 2 in Panel A shows a modest positive effect for the number of employees by 6%.
However, the effect is imprecisely estimated. Turning to Panel B, all dynamic estimates are imprecisely estimated.
The effect on productivity is consistent with the existing literature that shows productivity gains following privatizations (La Porta and de Silanes, 1999; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Estrin et al., 2009; Earle, 2014) . But in contrast to La Porta and de Silanes (1999) we find no evidence that employment cuts are part of the story behind increased productivity. Instead, our null effect on employment in combination with our finding on increased unemployment for existing workers suggest that worker churn might explain the increased productivity. Also, our firm and worker results highlight that firm-level employment effects may not be informative on how workers fare because it misses worker churn. To get a better understanding of how privatization affects existing workers, matched employer-employee data is needed.
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Rich Swedish registry data covering two decades allows us to examine how privatization affects individual workers and how firm-level employment estimates relate to worker level estimates. We show that privatization increases the unemployment incidence for workers employed in these firms by almost a fifth, and the number of unemployment days by a quarter, relative to control workers employed in SOEs not privatized. Hence, privatization led to nearly one million extra days of unemployment for the workers affected in our sample. Labor earnings and labor force participation remain unchanged. Despite increased transitions to unemployment, employment at the firm level remains constant and productivity increase which suggests that firm-level estimates that ignore churn of workers not necessarily proxy worker level outcomes. against event time in years around privatizations (horizontal axis). The outcome is unemployment incidence in figures A and B, unemployment days in figures C and D, log labor income (using the log inverse hyperbolic transformation) in figures E and F, and share of workers being out of the labor force in figure G and H. All years with a positive GDP-gap are defined as upturn years (2000, 01, 02, 04, 06, 07) , and all years with a negative GDP-gap as downturn years (1997, 98, 98, 99, 2003, 05, 08, 09, 10) . Workers in privatized firms are marked with continuous lines, and control workers with dotted lines. The sample consists of all privatizations of limited liability firms (aktiebolag) with more than ten employees undertaken between 1996 and 2010. We identify privatizations through changes in the Statistics Sweden institutional sector codes for firms. Industry classification is based on NACE Rev 1.1. Workers and firms are linked in November each year. (2000, 01, 02, 04, 06, 07) , and all years with a negative GDP-gap as downturn years (1997, 98, 98, 99, 2003, 05, 08, 09, 10) . The GDP-gap refers to the difference between potential GDP and actual GDP reported by the government agency National Institute of Economic Research (NIER). DiD refers to a difference-in-differences model and DiDiD refers to a triple difference model that is used to compare the two difference-in-differences in the two adjacent columns to the left. Average refers to the results (the β coefficient) using the model in Equation 1 Figure A1 : Robustness of matching procedure. These figures plot the density of the β -estimate in Eq. 1 when we re-do the random matching procedure one hundred times. The magnitude of the β -estimates are displayed on the x-axis and the frequency (in percent) on the y-axis. Black bars indicate β -estimates statistically significant at the 5% level or lower. Grey bars indicate β -estimates statistically significant above the 5% level.
